A Better Grounding for Person-Centered Medicine? by Little, M
1 |  P a g e
 
Postprint 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published in The American Journal of Bioethics on 17 July 2013, 
available online at http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/15265161.2013.804344  
 
A Better Grounding for Person-Centered Medicine? 
Miles Little, 2013 
Founding Director of the Centre for Values, Ethics and the Law in Medicine, University of Sydney, 
Australia 
 
There is nothing like medicine to attract reformers. Their arguments include claims that orthodox 
medicine produces iatrogenic harm, it is too expensive, it is arrogantly exclusive of other systems of 
practice, its practitioners lack empathy and communication skills, and its practitioners are wilfully 
ignorant of their patients’ beliefs and needs. Entwistle and Watt (2013) have done a good job of 
gathering together the suggested modes of reform from the last 50 years or so. They might well 
have gone back to Peabody (1927) and Osler (1948), and beyond to Colles (1881) and even to the 
Salerno school of the 11th century, because there is a long history of people and movements that 
have sought to make medicine more humanistic, more considerate, better behaved. There is an 
equally long history of criticism of the medical profession for its materialism, cynicism, and capacity 
for self-serving. All such criticisms deserve careful attention, and the profession's modern response 
has been to introduce processes that can be seen to deal with specific shortcomings. Yet the reform 
movements still proliferate—humane medicine, patient-centered care, narrative-based medicine, 
empathic care, mindful practice, values-based medicine, and most recently—and perhaps 
significantly—person-centered medicine (Ekman et al. 2012; Henry, Zaner, and Dittus 2007; Miles 
and Mezzich 2011a; Miles and Mezzich 2011b). The latter has become an umbrella term for 
Entwistle and Watt to cover all the qualitative reform movements that remain alive, if not 
flourishing. In doing this, they do us a service by reminding us of the common ground that these 
movements share. It should also remind us—although the article avoids dwelling on the matter—
that all the current schemes are offered as alternatives to the immense influence of evidence-based 
medicine (EBM). 
To explicit critiques of EBM there seems to be no end (Grossman 2008; Harari 2001; La Caze 2008; 
Lipworth, Carter, and Kerridge 2008; Lipworth, Little, and Kerridge 2011; Miles and Loughlin 2011; 
Raman 2011; Timmermans and Angell 2001; Timmermans and Kolker 2004; Tonelli 2006; Worrall 
2002). Volumes have been written about its epistemological, ontological, social, hermeneutic, and 
interpersonal shortcomings, and the harm it produces. There is only an embryonic form of public 
health ethics, yet public health is a paradigm of EBM. It gathers data en masse, and draws 
statistically based conclusions, but is only now stopping to consider the ethical implications of its 
impact on social practices and perceptions of health and the duties and rights involved in political 
definitions of healthy living and the parameters of the healthy person. Yet EBM flourishes and 
retains its following, even among those who can see its limitations. Entwistle and Watt offer a new 
and engaging insight to the values that underpin the critiques of EBM, but I am doubtful that their 
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tightly argued abstractions will capture the hearts, minds, and imaginations of those who matter in 
this conflict of discourses, the members of the medical professions. Sociologists and perhaps 
philosophers of medicine seem far more likely to adopt its precepts—but that will not necessarily 
change medical practice. 
What Entwistle and Watt are doing is initiating a new subdiscourse to the medical reform discourse 
(Fairclough 1992; Gee 1999; Little, Jordens, and Sayers 2003; Swales 1990). They are introducing 
special terms to capture their ideas, terms such as “person-al” and “capabilities,” the latter drawn 
from the discourse formulated by Amartya Sen (1993) and Martha Nussbaum. They ask us to situate 
persons in their social context, to consider their autonomy as relational autonomy, and above all to 
consider their human capabilities and their person-al capabilities. I really hope that they can manage 
to attract support, because I agree with their arguments and their conclusions. To achieve a 
profession populated (almost) entirely by those who can respect the social context of every patient, 
can be aware of capability theory, and engage with the real preferences of patients would be 
marvellous. Medicine would indeed flourish, as long as it retained its technical abilities to treat 
effectively, and its research capacities that sought to bring better and safer treatments to bear on 
suffering people. 
There are several impediments to such an achievement, none of them saying that we should not try 
to attain the goals that Entwistle and Watt suggest. First, there is the imperfection of human nature; 
second, the question of public trust in doctors; third, the knowledge of medical virtues already 
possessed by doctors; fourth, the uncertainty that the professionals have about the reality of the 
discourse of reform; and fifth, the implacability of the system within which health care must be 
delivered. 
Most doctors try hard to relate to their patients. Some do it well, because they are natural 
communicators. Others do it badly, but can be taught techniques for showing empathy. Still others 
have no talent for relation and communication, whatever they are taught as students or as 
graduates. The same can be said of lawyers, priests, and shopkeepers. People are as they are, and 
changing their natures poses just as many moral problems as paternalism in doctor–patient 
relationships. Medical schools increasingly try to select people with approved motives to do 
medicine, and demonstrable communication skills and capacities for moral reasoning. Perhaps this 
will make a difference in the long term, but the neophyte from the medical school will need to cope 
with and resist at least some aspects of the enculturation that happens when people enter the 
established systems of hospital and office practice. 
The second problem is with trust. Curiously, it does not seem to be distrust that we must deal with, 
but the high level of trust that patients repose in doctors (Hardie and Critchley 2008; Jenkinson et al. 
2002; Lipworth et al. 2009). They trust them (with notable exceptions) to tell the truth, and they 
trust them to be moral in their research and practice. Why would this be so if doctors are 
communicating so badly, showing so little empathy, and so little concern for the social context of 
their patients? This phenomenon needs explaining, and incorporating into any theory of medical 
reform. It would be terrible to lose sight of something so central to the delivery of health care. It 
needs explanation and it needs explicit measures to preserve it. 
The third issue is that of knowledge. The Aristotelean and Platonic view that knowledge of the good 
makes it impossible to do what is bad has been extraordinarily persistent. Educating doctors is seen 
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to be the best way to give them grounds for virtuous behavior. But our own research suggests that 
doctors have a very good knowledge of a particular form of virtue ethics that emphasises phronesis 
expressed as relevant beneficent action according to person and context (Little et al. 2011). 
Increased knowledge alone does not seem to guarantee any profound change in the perceived 
shortcomings of doctors. 
It is against this background, then, that reform movements must operate—against entrenched 
human nature, against a high level of trust invested by the public, and against an already 
sophisticated understanding of medical virtues. Thus, medical professionals view with some 
skepticism the attempts at qualitative reform, and this is the fourth problem for qualitative reform. 
To shift the nature of a discourse, the target audience has to perceive that there is a real issue at 
stake (Little 2012). EBM provides a good example. When it was first proposed, it was immediately 
clear that the majority of medical interventions were supported by evidence of the weakest kind. 
The move toward higher level evidence through clinical trials and meta-analyses seemed therefore 
to bring something that was much needed to medicine. It promised to provide the hard evidence for 
advice and actions that was missing from the more traditional practice of conventional medicine. 
While EBM has lost a good deal of its almost transcendental status under severe critiques, it remains 
viable because numerical evidence is seen as a “real” part of good medical judgement and practice. 
Fifth and finally, medical reform has to consider the system in which health care is delivered. 
Patients trust doctors and scientists, but not the system in which they work (Morrell et al. 2011). 
Doctors have clear ideas about medical virtues, but express resentment of the bureaucracy that 
constrains their abilities to deliver services. No one seems to question that the complexity of 
modern health services demands a complex administration, but the majority of people (doctors, 
nurses, other health care workers, patients, and their families) distrust and dislike the way in which 
the system depersonalises them, makes them wait, and makes them feel devalued and vulnerable. 
Entwistle and Watt sketch a fine system that would encourage respect, mutual acceptance of social 
backgrounds, good practice, and a particular attention to “person-al capabilities” in health practice. 
They have been meticulous in defining the terms they use, and they point in the direction they 
would like their discourse to move. Their article is written with a persuasive modesty that is very 
appealing. But their discourse, like every other within the qualitative reform movement, faces at 
least the five problems just outlined. Their preliminary work certainly deserves to be seen as 
addressing a “real” problem, and it deserves to be included within the rubric of person-centered 
medicine. I very much hope that their further work and their persistence of belief will carry them 
over the five hurdles identified here, and over the many others that I have no doubt missed. 
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